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Regional anti-corruption effort, political connections and firm 
innovation effort: Evidence from China 
 
Abstract: This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti-corruption 
effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D 
investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A-share listed enterprises. Our results show 
that the local anti-corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the 
strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D 
investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating 
effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D 
investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources 
and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance 
on political connections and government funding. The results of this study suggest 
that the availability of a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise 
innovation activities is indispensable.  
Keywords: Political connections; enterprise R&D investment; local anti-corruption; 
firm age; firm size; China. 
JEL: G38; N45; L26; L25 
 
1. Introduction 
Political connections, which are viewed as one type of valuable resource, play a 
crucial role in helping enterprises to obtain considerable funding (e.g., tax exemptions, 
funding support, project subsidies, interest-free loans, or discounted government loans) 
(Faccio, 2010; Bayraktar & Moreno-Dodson, 2015). Political connections also help to 
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alleviate enterprises’ financial constraints, especially in an incomplete or less 
developed market with a lack of mature legal infrastructure (e.g., Yen et al. 2014; Cull 
et al., 2015; Zhou, 2013; Li et al., 2008; Cai and Li, 2014; Walder, 2002). The 
relationship between political connections and R&D activities has been broadly 
examined in prior studies, but the results are inconsistent and varying. Previous 
studies have found a positive effect of political connections on R&D (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005, Johnson and Mitton, 2003; and Faccio, 2006), a negative impact of 
political connections on R&D (Jackowicz et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Luo, 2008; 
Wang and Chung, 2013; Fan et al., 2007), and an inverted U-shaped relationship, 
whereby the positive effect of political ties on product innovation gradually increases 
with the costs of establishing political ties, and then decreases again above a certain 
threshold (Wu, 2011, Song et al., 2015).  
The inconsistent positive effect of political connections on enterprises’ R&D 
investment may be attributed to the fact that prior studies did not take into 
consideration the influence of external factors (e.g., legal environment) and firm 
characteristics (e.g., firm types, age and size) on innovation outputs (Jiao et al., 2015; 
Allred and Park, 2007; Qian, 2007; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). This is the principal 
focus of our study. In this research, we model anti-corruption effort as a moderating 
variable, and examine how the establishment of anti-corruption institutions can adjust 
the positive effect of political connections on enterprises’ R&D input. The 
institutional environment in a transition economy with low rent-seeking costs may 
lead to strong political connections (Shleifer & Vishn, 1994; Al-Azzam, 2016). 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) refers the difference between the expected return 
on a stock and the actual return. Prior studies propose that political ties usually 
generate a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 4.32% in a 
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country with high-level corruption, but the value of CAR will be reduced to a 
negative impact (-0.02%) in countries with low-level corruption (Faccio, et al., 2006). 
However, in the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark (Barfort, et al., 2015), 
political connections still exert a significant positive effect on firms’ performance 
(Amore and Bennedsen, 2013). Anti-corruption effort may therefore moderate the 
positive effect of political connections on enterprises’ R&D input. 
Firm characteristics should also moderate the relationship between a firm’s 
political connections and its R&D input. We argue that the effect of government 
funding on a firm’s innovation activities should vary with the growth of the firm. 
Although a large and mature firm is more likely to obtain state funding, we expect 
that the relationship between political connections and private R&D investment will 
be weakened. We further examine the moderating effect of two firm characteristics – 
firm size and age – on the above relationship. 
This study contributes to the literature on political connections in several 
important ways. First, this study is the first to explore how the strength of ties with 
government or politicians relates to firms’ innovation effort. We provide empirical 
evidence to explain the inconsistent findings on the precise role of political ties on 
firms’ private R&D investment. Second, our findings extend the literature to consider 
the impact of external contextual factors (local anti-corruption effort) on the 
relationship between a firm’s political connections and its innovation effort. 
Following previous studies examining the different effects of political ties in countries 
or regions with different levels of corruption, our study empirically investigates how 
different local anti-corruption policies can moderate the relationship between political 
connections and enterprises’ R&D investment in China, where an anti- corruption 
campaign is currently being implemented. President Xi launched a far-reaching 
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campaign against corruption in China following the conclusion of the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party in 2012. Most of the officials investigated were 
removed from office and faced accusations of bribery and abuse of power 
(ChinaPower, 2013). Thus, we used the two-year event window to measure the 
moderating effect of anti-corruption activities. The anti-corruption campaign created 
an ideal empirical setting for us to examine the moderating effect of local 
anti-corruption activities. Our findings may contribute to helping governments in 
transitional economies to improve their current legal institutions and then to decrease 
politicians’ rent-seeking behavior. Third, we contribute to examining the moderating 
effects of the influence of inner contextual factors（firm age and size) on the 
relationship between political connection and enterprises’ R&D investment, using 
data collected from Chinese firms with different characteristics. These additional 
results serve as a justification of the unstable effect of political connection identified 
by prior studies.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the theoretical background of the study and introduces hypotheses. This is followed 
by a section discussing the research methods used in the study. The empirical results 
are provided in Section four. Finally, the last section discusses the practical and 
theoretical contribution of the study, along with limitations and directions for future 
research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. The effect of political connections on enterprises’ innovation activities  
The complex, uncertain and risky nature of enterprises’ innovation activities makes 
R&D investment an unstable approach for yielding the expected innovation outputs 
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(e.g., new products) in a given period (Lin et al., 2011).  
From the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), enterprises with strong political connections may receive 
priority channels for obtaining government resources and funding support to alleviate 
their financial constraints (Cull et al., 2015). Developing political connections may 
enable firms to better understand the unwritten rules of funding allocation and to 
achieve a competitive advantage. Existing studies suggest that political connections 
exert a positive effect on firms’ innovation capabilities and innovation outputs (e.g., 
Wu, 2011; Shi and Zhu, 2014). For instance, Wu (2011) conducted an extensive 
survey of 766 Chinese firms and found that the relationship between political ties and 
product innovation is an inverted U-shape, indicating that the positive effect of 
political ties on product innovation diminishes as the costs of political ties begin to 
outweigh the benefits. Shi and Zhu (2014) empirically examine the relationship 
between political connections and technology innovation outputs through a sample of 
243 listed firms in the information technology industry and 120 listed firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry in China and show that political connections have a positive 
impact on a firm’s technology innovation outputs.  
Conversely, using a theoretical framework combining stakeholder theory with 
the resource-based view (RBV), Lin et al. (2014) investigate the effects of firms’ 
political capital on firm innovation via a survey of 791 private manufacturing firms in 
China. Their study however reveal a negative relationship between the two variables. 
Wang and Chung (2013) used a sample of 420 firms from key industrial sectors listed 
in the Taiwan Yellow Pages and the Taiwan Stock Exchange listings. A survey was 
delivered to CEOs and senior managers. Based on 122 valid firm responses, they 
argue that some firms with strong political connections may receive government 
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favoritism but still lack innovation capabilities. One plausible explanation is that 
strong political ties impede a firm’s innovation activities and development. First, from 
the knowledge management perspective, the organizational culture regarding 
knowledge management processes for a firm with strong political connections usually 
tends to be more hierarchical than that of a firm with poor political connections. A 
hierarchical corporate culture will significantly reduce a firm’s intrinsic motivation 
toward strengthening product innovation, thus leading to a negative impact on 
knowledge coordination and integration and innovation activities (Sethi et al., 2001). 
A firm's high-level political connections may also be harmful for the implementation 
of the firm’s customer orientation and market-stimulated innovation strategies (Luo, 
2008). This may lead to an infant industry dilemma, whereby firms are assisted by 
subsidies or other forms of government resources, but end up being unsustainable and 
more importantly unable to cultivate innovation capability and become internationally 
competitive (Saure, 2007; Melitz, 2005). 
Thus, we propose the following competing hypotheses:  
H1a: Political connections exert a positive effect on enterprises’ private R&D 
investment.  
H1b: Political connections exert a negative effect on enterprises’ private R&D 
investment. 
H1c: Political connections exert little effect on enterprises’ private R&D 
investment. 
Following prior studies, we propose that the impact of political connections on R&D 
investment is not independent from firms’ characteristics and their external context 
(e.g., local legal enforcement). Thus, it is imperative to investigate how political 
connections provide varying effects on R&D under different conditions. A better 
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understanding of the moderating effect of firms’ characteristics and institutional 
context is essential to inform government on how to more cost-effectively allocate 
resources, and thereby optimize subsidy strategies. 
 
2.2. The moderating effects of firm characteristics 
Prior studies have suggested that firm characteristics sometimes significantly adjust 
the positive relationship between a firm’s input efforts and output findings: examples 
include the relationship between technology investments and high-growth profitability 
(Wöhrl et al., 2009), and the relationship between external technology acquisition and 
product innovativeness (Tsai et al., 2011). In addition, firm size is one of the most 
commonly studied organizational factors in the innovation literature (Damanpour, 
1992). For example, compared with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
large-scale firms have more financial and technical capabilities and are more active at 
leveraging external resources for developing innovative research projects (Dooley et 
al., 2015; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Hitt et al., 1991; Wakasugi and Koyata 1997). 
R&D is typically associated with uncertainty and risk, and large-scale firms usually 
have accumulated considerable practical experience and resources for risk 
management to gradually transfer novel business ideas into innovative products (Ettlie 
and Rubenstein, 1987; Golovko and Valentini, 2014). Small firms show a higher 
dependence on obtaining government funding through private political connections 
due to limited external resources and technical advantages (Prajogo et al., 2013; Zhou, 
2013). We argue that large, mature firms will have established more business 
cooperation partners and will therefore be able to use these connections to obtain 
more non-government resources for their R&D. Thus, we posit the following 
hypotheses: 
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H2: Firm age negatively moderates the relationship between political 
connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. 
H3: Firm size negatively moderates the relationship between political 
connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. 
 
2.3. The moderating effects of the degree of local anti-corruption effort 
In some countries that lack poor legal enforcement, company managers may 
develop unlawful personal connections. Such personal connections represent a closet 
relationship, which may be a key ingredient in helping firms to obtain external 
resources. For instance, developing a solid personal relationship (i.e., “Guanxi”) with 
government officers in China is critical to secure government subsidies. Guanxi 
enables these companies to quickly obtain important information regarding 
government subsides, including the review criteria and application procedures. 
However, such personal relationships increase company managers’ intentions to carry 
out rent-seeking behaviors, due to a lack of legal enforcement. Consequently, public 
officials offer special services to select private firms in order to obtain personal 
benefits, violating the law and their duties.  
Xin and Pearce (1996) argue that “Guanxi” can be used as a substitute for formal 
institutional support in China. Government officials may secretly provide important 
funding information to company leaders. Corrupt companies could unlawfully obtain 
considerable government funding for their R&D development (Yu and Pan, 2008). We 
argue that such “rent-seeking” behavior will be significantly inhibited by the 
implementation of anti-corruption campaigns. As a result, government officers are 
unlikely to offer illegitimate support to companies even if the company leaders have a 
strong relationship with them. In other words, the role of political connections in 
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helping companies to obtain government subsidies for R&D development will be 
decreased. Zhou (2014) found that the role of political connections significantly 
declines as the Chinese government pays more attention to implementing institutional 
reforms and law enforcement. Thus, we propose that anti-corruption campaigns will 
moderate the influence of political connections (i.e. their importance in determining 
R&D investment will decrease as an anti-corruption campaign deepens). Drawing on 
this logic we predict:  
H4: The strength of an anti-corruption campaign negatively moderates the 
relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. 
 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Sample  
In this study, the research hypotheses are empirically examined in China. Firms in 
China are more likely to establish personal political connections to better understand 
the mechanisms of funding allocation in China – these are somewhat less transparent 
and market-oriented compared to Western countries (Chen and Wu, 2011). The 
Chinese government has launched a series of severe anti-corruption campaigns since 
2012, which have prosecuted over 100 high-ranking government officials. Such a 
national anti-corruption campaign is expected to create an ideal empirical setting for 
us to examine the moderating effect of local anti-corruption activities. Recent 
empirical findings show that, following the anti-corruption campaign and the 
development of regional anti-corruption institutions (e.g., the inner-party supervision 
institute and the institute for selecting and employing supervisory roles), political 
connections have a less significant role in helping enterprises to improve their 
innovation capabilities (Zhou, 2014). These unique anti-corruption institutions allow 
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us to explore how the level of local anti-corruption effort moderates the relationship 
between political connections and enterprises’ R&D investment, which contributes to 
a better understanding of the role of political connections in different legal contexts.  
Data from 2,587 Chinese A-share listed enterprises (on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges) were collected from 2012 to 2014, which includes 
information such as firm size, income and fixed assets. These firms are located in 
China’s 21 provinces, 4 municipalities, or 5 autonomous regions, excluding the 
special administrative regions (i.e., Hong Kong and Macau). Overall, 12 industries are 
included in the sample: Industrial Manufacturing (35.433%), IT (2.978%), and 
Software and Information Technology Services (38.449%) (See Table 1). The average 
number of employees in these firms is 5,681 and 50% of firms have less than 1,570 
employees. The average age of firms in the sample is 18.243 years (See Table 2). 
To assess the degree of local anti-corruption effort, data were collected from two 
widely used databases in China: the Procuratorial Yearbook (2012-2014) and the 
China Statistical Yearbook (2012-2014). The former records the annual number of 
corruption and bribery cases in each province or municipality, while the latter collects 
the annual number of civil servants in each administrative division of China. We then 
average the number of corruption and bribery cases across the three-year period to 
measure the degree of local anti-corruption effort.  
               *** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
3.2. Measures  
The independent variable R&Dinput was measured using the average share of 
enterprises’ private R&D investment as a proportion of their annual revenues from 
2012-2014. We define private R&D investment as innovative ideas, information and 
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other intangible elements (e.g., property rights) contributed by a firm’s R&D 
employees. However, since R&Dinput is hard to measure empirically because of its 
intangibility, we use private R&D investment as a proximate predictor of R&D input 
in this research. We argue that enterprises need to spend considerable funding on 
producing these intangible assets (e.g., novel business ideas), and thus private R&D 
investment may be viewed as an indicator of the relative strength of enterprises’ R&D 
input. 
PoliticalConnection was modeled as an independent variable in this research. 
Prior studies on revolving doors (e.g., Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992; Salant,1995) 
suggest a company manager is expected to utilize his or her former network of 
political relationships to help a company if they were employed previously as a civil 
servant or public servant. Following prior studies (e.g., Peng and Luo, 2000), we 
measure this variable by reviewing leadership team members’ interpersonal 
relationships with Chinese government officials based on two steps. First, we used 
automated techniques for data collection and analysis. We developed a web crawler to 
collect relevant data from Eastmoney.com – a Chinese financial and stock information 
website. Our web crawler visits Eastmoney.com and automatically collects all the 
required information in the summary section of firms, including managers’ personal 
experience. The information was downloaded and saved in CSV file format for further 
statistical analysis. Managers’ profiles were collected at a disaggregate level 
(individual profiles) so that it was possible to parse individual profiles and aggregate 
them for our analysis. We examined whether or not individuals had previous work 
experience in any Chinese government sector. Second, a 5-point Likert scale with a 
score of 5 indicating ‘the strongest political connections’ and a score of 1 indicating 
‘the weakest political connections’ was used. The score was rated based on company 
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leaders’ political rank in their past positions, such as national-level leaders, 
provincial-level officials, and prefecture-department officials. We calculate the 
“political connections” for a firm based on the total sum of all senior management 
team members’ (e.g., president, vice president and CEO) scores for political 
connections. Three researchers were invited to rate the degree of political connections 
of company leaders respectively and inconsistency ratings were reviewed and a final 
score determined.  
    *** INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
             *** INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *** 
Three moderating variables are included in our model: ,  
and . The variable  represents the annual average number of 
corruption and bribery cases per 10,000 civil servants in an administrative division 
between 2012 and 2014. We use the average total number of employees of a firm 
between 2012 and 2014 as . The variable was measured by the 
time that a firm has been legally established.  
Control variables may potentially influence the dependent variables in a 
research model (Doney and Cannon, 1997). To examine the influence of political 
connections on R&D input and the moderating effect of the above three variables (i.e., 
,  and ) on this relationship, this study controls for four 
factors. The variable  represents the average share of government 
subsidies in annual revenues for each enterprise from 2012-2014. Related data were 
collected from financial indicators listed in the annual reports of enterprises.  
refers to a firm’s annual overall sales revenue. refers to the percentage of 
the shares of the largest shareholder of an enterprise; ROA represents the return on 
assets of an enterprise, which includes the return on total assets, return on total core 
Anticorrupt Firmsize
Firmage Anticorrupt
Firmsize Firmage
Anticorrupt Firmsize Firmage
GovSupport
Income
Topshare
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assets, return on net assets, and return on total net worth. 
 
4. Data analysis and results 
We use two sets of regression equations for the data analysis. Model A describes the 
relationship between political connections and R&D private investment for examining 
Hypothesis 1:  
Model A: DinputRonnectionPoliticalCfbb &)(10   
 
In addition to a linear equation, different functions representing the degree of political 
connections were used in Model A to investigate in detail the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables (see Table 5). 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
The linear regression of Model A shows that there is a positive relationship 
between enterprises’ political connections and R&D private investment (H1 
supported). As Table 5 illustrates, the linear equation offers the best result, while 
further sophistication via the quadratic and cubic equations do not increase the 
explanatory values (R2) and significance. Moreover, following Anderson and 
Burnham (2002) and Akaike (1974), we calculate the AIC (Akaike Information 
Criterion), which adjusts each model's likelihood to take the number of parameters 
into account. We compute this criterion for each model, then choose the model with 
the smallest AIC (i.e. the linear model). We also consider other indices, such as 
RMSE. Lower values of RMSE indicate better fit. RMSE is a good measure of how 
accurately the model predicts the response, and is the most important criterion for fit 
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if the main purpose of the model is prediction. The linear model based on our dataset 
has the lowest value. Therefore, we will use a linear regression model to estimate the 
relationships between multi-variables. 
To examine the moderating effects of firm age, size and the degree of 
anti-corruption effort (i.e., H2, H3, H4 and H5), a step-wise regression procedure was 
used to take into account firm age, firm size, and anti-corruption effort as interaction 
terms. The step-wise approach is increasingly used in multivariate statistics to 
enhance the explanatory power of regression analysis (Royston and Sauerbrei, 2008). 
In this approach, cross product terms (i.e., FirmsizeonnectionPoliticalC * ,
FirmageonnectionPoliticalC * , and tAnticorruponnectionPoliticalC * ) were 
introduced, adding additional terms to the equations from step one to step two (Neter 
et al., 1990). We use an F-statistic to examine the moderating effects of firm age, size 
and the degree of anti-corruption effort. The results are statistically significant if the 
additionally explained variance (R2) shows a substantial increase in the F-statistic 
(Hoffman et al., 1992). 
The statistical models examined in our analysis are as follows: 
Model 1a:  
 
Model 1b:  
 
Model 2a: 
 
Model 2b:  
DinputRFirmagebonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab &** 2100 
DinputRFirmageonnectionPoliticalCb
FirmagebonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab
&)*(
**
3
2100


DinputRFirmsizebonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab &** 2100 
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Model 3a: 
 
Model 3b: 
 
 
The results of the estimations of the linear models are presented in Table 6. For 
the dependent variable in each model, three different models were estimated. First, 
models with only control variables were estimated (see Model 0 in Table 6). This 
model serves as a baseline model. The three moderating variables Anticorrupt, 
Firmsize and Firmage respectively were added to the baseline model. Our research 
findings show that the baseline model was highly significant and had a relatively high 
explanatory power (28.9%).  
 
*** INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Table 6 summarizes the moderating effect of firm size on the relationship 
between political connections and enterprise R&D investment. The value of R2 in 
model 1 increased to 37.3% when the moderating variable was introduced. The results 
presented in Model 1 show a negative interaction effect of firm size on the influence 
of political connection (b3=-0.209, p<0.01) on enterprise R&D investment (H3 
supported).  
Table 6 also presents the moderating effect of firm age on the relationship 
DinputRFirmsizeonnectionPoliticalCb
FirmsizebonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab
&)*(
**
3
2100


DinputRtAnticorrupbonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab &** 2100 
DinputRtAnticorruponnectionPoliticalCb
tAnticorrupbonnectionPoliticalCbcontrolab
&)*(
**
3
2100


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between political connections and enterprise R&D investment. The value of R2 in 
Model 2 increased to 31.8% when the moderating variable was introduced. The 
results presented in Model 2 show a negative interaction effect of firm age on the 
relationship between political connections and enterprises’private R&D investment 
(b4=-0.129, p<0.01) (H2 supported). Our empirical findings show that large-scale 
enterprises will have more innovative resources to utilize, thereby reducing their 
reliance on political resources as compared to SMEs. 
To examine how the degree of local anti-corruption effort moderates the positive 
effect of political connections on enterprise R&D investment, we further introduce the 
interaction term  into Model 3b. Our findings 
show that the degree of local anti-corruption effort has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between political connection and enterprise R&D investment at the 10% 
level of significance (b5=-.026, p<0.1) (H4 supported). 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has investigated the role of political connections in motivating 
enterprises’ private R&D investment, including an examination of the moderating 
effects of firm age, firm size and the degree of local anti-corruption effort on this 
relationship.  
We find that political connections do positively influence a firm’s R&D 
investment, rather than hinder innovation activities. Most of prior studies are 
conducted based on a relatively small sample or based on one or two industries. 
Instances of such work include that of Wu (2011), who investigated 766 firms in five 
manufacturing sectors, Shi and Zhu (2014), who empirically test the influence of 
political connections on R&D through a sample of 243 listed firms in the information 
tAnticorruponnectionPoliticalC *
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technology industry and 120 listed firms in the pharmaceutical industry in China, Lin 
et al. (2014), who use a survey of 791 private manufacturing firms in China, and 
Wang and Chung (2013), who identified 420 firms from key industrial sectors in 
Taiwan. This research developed a web crawler to automatically extract information 
about all public companies trading on the two Chinese stock exchanges, that is, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Thus, our empirical 
findings should be more reliable for generalization (i.e., have external validity) due to 
a large sample across different regions and 13 industries. The main effect of political 
connections on firm innovation (b1=0.145) that we found in this paper was consistent 
with the results of Wu (2011) (b1=0.02) and Shu et al. (2012) (b1=2.33).  
By being connected to government officials, firms are able to identify potential 
funding sources and to quickly understand the application procedures to be able to 
secure the R&D subsidies available. China’s business relationships are highly socially 
embedded and so the social capital within these political connections is advantageous 
to the firm’s ability to invest in R&D activities within this political context. Political 
connections may buffer firms from financial pressures and act as a helping hand for 
enterprises to gain more government subsidies for risky and uncertainty innovation 
activities.  
Our research findings show that firm characteristics (i.e., size and age) 
significantly moderate the role of political connections on enterprises’ R&D and 
innovation activities. Thus, it appears that the role of political resources in motivating 
an enterprise’s innovation efforts will gradually decrease as the enterprise grows or 
matures. One plausible explanation for this finding is that a large or mature company 
is likely to have accumulated business resources and external partnerships, thus 
decreasing its dependence on government subsidies for R&D. This suggests that it 
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will be easier for large and more mature companies to gain substantive support from 
relationships with suppliers, universities, customers, and even competitors for their 
innovation efforts. Small and new firms are more dependent on government subsidies 
for their R&D projects and innovation activities. The moderating role of local 
anti-corruption effort on the main effect suggests that institutional reforms and law 
enforcement will weaken the relationship between political connections and 
enterprises’ R&D investment as a fair and transparent environment for enterprises is 
established. As a result, the rent-seeking behavior of government officials is 
significantly inhibited. Thus, enterprises should place an emphasis on strengthening 
sustainable innovation using other non-official financial resources, such as 
establishing cooperation with universities on emerging projects.  
The practical implications of our findings are that government departments 
should consider offering specialized R&D funding for new firms and SMEs to help 
them launch innovative activities. Startup companies should place more emphasis on 
developing sustained relationships with a diverse range of business partners to enable 
them to obtain valuable business resources and to reduce their reliance on government 
subsidies and funding. The moderating effect of anti-corruption campaigns provides 
an important tool for government: countries with transition economies should seek to 
increase the development of open and transparent government institutions and 
establish more objective mechanisms. This will reduce the reliance on political 
connections and reduce corruption within the institutional environment, providing a 
more level playing field for all firms.   
This study is not without limitations. First, the study has been conducted within a 
single market context (i.e., Mainland China). To be able to generalize the findings to 
other countries would require that the specific characteristics of these countries are 
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understood. Further research should replicate this study in different countries and 
political contexts. Second, we only focus on the political connections of firm 
leadership, and ignore other firm or management team characteristics, such as 
business ties, professional ties, industry experience, and board composition, which 
may also influence firms’ innovation strategies (Yoo and Reed, 2015). Third, we 
sample a three year-period of data (i.e., 2012 to 2014) to calculate the level of local 
anti-corruption effort, thus limiting the delayed moderating effect of anti-corruption. 
This may help to explain why the moderating effect of anti-corruption effort is 
significant only at the 10% level. An ideal empirical design for testing fully the 
moderating effect of anti-corruption effort would be a longitudinal comparison of the 
role of political connections on R&D investment over time, and consequently, this is 
recommended as an avenue for future research. 
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Table 1. Industries in the sample 
 
Industry  Percentage Average R&D intensity  
Industrial manufacturing 35.433% 3.859% 
Agriculture and forestry 1.684% 1.370% 
Mining 2.898% 2.320% 
Electricity, heat and gas 3.454% 0.062% 
Transport, warehousing 
and postal services 
3.454% 0.720% 
Information technology 2.978% 12.780% 
Software and information 
technology service 
38.449% 11.540% 
Water conservancy and 
environmental 
management 
1.191% 3.420% 
Culture, sports and 
entertainment 
1.311% 4.030% 
Health and social work 2.143% 2.456% 
Scientific research and 
technical services 
0.794% 4.165% 
Wholesale and retail trade 6.074% 1.812% 
Note: Percentage represents the share of firms from the corresponding industry to the total number 
of firms; Average R&D intensity represents the average R&D spending (investment) of firms in 
each industry as a share of income.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N=2,587) 
 
Variable  Mean St. Dev. Median 
1.AntiCorrup 22.207 6.381 23.02 
2.GovSupport 0.019 0.084 0.007 
3.R&Dinput 0.034 0.046 0.029 
4.Income 937334.2 7728463 119314.6 
5.Topshare 32.438 18.662 31.73 
6.Firmsize 6089.929 24994.85 1683 
7.PoliticalConnection  8.647 9.520 1 
8.Fixedassets 311634.6 2050725 37851.37 
9.ROA 7.717 10.807 6.262 
10.Firmage 18.243 5.044 18 
Note: We calculate the “political connections” for a firm based on the total sum of all 
senior management team members’ score on political connections. Each member’s 
political connection score varies between 0 and 5.  
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Table 3. Correlations 
 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
 
  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.AntiCorrup 1 -0.002 -0.138*** -0.094*** -0.129*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.083*** -0.036* 0.105*** 
2.GovSupport -0.002 1 0.101*** 0.020 0.012*** 0.031 0.003 0.016 0.068*** -0.012 
3.R&Dinput -0.138*** 0.101*** 1 0.064*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 0.217*** 0.081*** 0.029 -0.187*** 
4.Income -0.094*** 0.020 0.064*** 1 0.133*** 0.762*** 0.132*** 0.849*** -0.022 -0.001 
5.Topshare -0.002 0.012*** 0.098*** 0.133*** 1 0.146*** 0.190*** 0.155*** 0.187*** -0.023 
6.Firmsize -0.129*** 0.031 0.093*** 0.762*** 0.146*** 1 0.206*** 0.722*** -0.044** -0.040** 
7.PoliticalConnection  -0.001 0.003 0.217*** 0.132*** 0.190*** 0.206*** 1 0.179*** -0.083*** 0.164*** 
8.Fixedassets 
-0.083*** 0.016 0.081*** 0.849*** 0.155*** 0.722*** 0.179*** 1 -0.028 -0.010 
9.ROA -0.036* 0.068*** 0.029 -0.022 0.187*** -0.044** -0.083*** -0.028 1 -0.134*** 
10.Firmage 0.105*** -0.012 -0.187*** -0.001 -0.023 -0.040** 0.164*** -0.010 -0.134*** 1 
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Table 4. The score of political rank 
 
Score Political rank 
5 National-level leaders and 
provincial-level officials 
4 Prefecture-department officials 
3 County level 
2 Township level 
1 Village level or below 
0 No political experience 
 
Table 5. Results of regressions of model A 
 
Type of 
Model A 
Equation R2 Signif.  
of F 
Stand. coeff. b RMSE 
Linear 
 
 0.304 0.00 0.145***      0.886 
Quadratic 
 
0.303 0.00 0.068**(b1); 
0.149***(b2) 
     0.884 
Cubic 
 
0.303 0.00 0.080(b1); 
0.193(b2); 
-0.025(b3) 
     0.884 
Inverted 
 
0298 0.00 0.113***((b1)      0.883 
The dependent variable is R&D input 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1  
Xbby 10 
2
210 XbXbby 
3
3
2
210 XbXbXbby 
X
b
by 10 
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Table 6. Results of regression analysis 
 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
Variables 
  
OLS 
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
(Constant) -.242*** -1.440** -0.104** -0.154*** 0.116** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
Control variables 
GovSupport -.171*** -.222*** -.228*** -.177*** -.179*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
Income 0.849*** 0.640*** 0.678*** 0.857*** 0.848*** 0.856*** 0.853*** 
Topshare 0.007*** 0.005*** .005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Fixedassets -0.303*** -0.433*** -0.413*** -0.325*** -0.323*** -0.327*** -0.326*** 
ROA 0.002 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011  0.009  0.008 
Main effects     
PoliticalConnection (PC)  0.090*** 0.063*** 0.290*** 0.155*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
Firmsize  0.516*** 0.768***     
Firmage    -0.053*** -0.071***   
AntiCorrup      -0.053* -0.048** 
Interaction terms     
PC*Firmsize   -0.209***     
PC* Firmage     -0.129***   
PC*AntiCorrup       -0.026* 
Number of Observations 2587 2587 2587 2587 2587 2587 2587 
F 180.370 181.743 164.818 139.256 129.160 138.055 121.545 
R2 0.289 0.365 0.373 0.306 0.318 0.305 0.305 
Adj R2  0.363*** 0.371*** 0.303*** 0.316*** 0.302*** 0.303* 
The dependent variable is R&D input 
